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ABSTRACT: The paper emphasizes significant resemblances between the Informal Logic Initiative 
and the Lvov-Warsaw School (LWS) – the Polish philosophical movement (1895-1939), the rise of 
which is associated with “the Golden Age of Science and Letters”. The correspondence between 
informal logic and the logical studies of the LWS will be explored by discussing their subject-matter, 
goals, and methods. The project focused on applying logical studies of the LWS in analyzing and 
assessing arguments will be proposed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of the paper is to propose the direction of systematic inquiry into the 
overlap between the Informal Logic Initiative and the logical studies of the Lvov-
Warsaw School (LWS) – the Polish philosophical movement (1895-1939) 
established by Twardowski at the end of the 19th century in Lwów (Lvov) (see 
Woleński, 1989, Ch. 1; Lapointe et al., 2009). Mostly because of the developments of 
mathematical logic made by such thinkers as Lejewski, Leśniewski, Łukasiewicz, 
Mostowski, Sobociński, Tarski, and many others (see, e.g., Coniglione et al. (eds.), 
1993; Kneale & Kneale, 1962; McCall, 1967; Woleński, 1995), the rise of the LWS is 
recognized as “the Golden Age of Science and Letters” (Simons, 2002). 
Although analytic philosophers discuss in details the heritage of the LWS 
(see, e.g. Jadacki, 2009; Simons, 1992; Smith, 2006; Woleński, 1989), it is not 
sufficiently represented in world’s philosophy. According to the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Woleński, 2010), apart from the achievements in 
mathematical logic, the LWS is scarcely known outside Poland as the broader 
philosophical enterprise: 
 
As far as the matter concerns international importance, one thing is clear. The 
logical achievements of the LWS became the most famous. Doubtless, the Warsaw 
school of logic contributed very much to the development of logic in the 20th 
century. Other contributions are known but rather marginally. This is partially due 
to the fact that most philosophical writings of the LWS appeared in Polish. However, 
this factor does not explain everything. Many writings of the LWS were originally 
published in English, French or German. However, their influence was very 
moderate, considerably lesser than that of similar writings of philosophers from the 
leading countries (Woleński, 2010). 
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 Similar observations are made by Simons, who notices that the LWS is not 
sufficiently recognized outside Poland. However, some intensive efforts towards its 
popularization are undertaken: 
 
So interest in the Poles remains scant and patchy outside Poland. However, Jan 
Woleński, Jacek Juliusz Jadacki and other Poles continue to write about the 
movement in the old country, and there are several scholars abroad who are doing 
good work, notably Arianna Betti in Amsterdam, and Anna Zielińska and Wioletta 
Miskiewicz in Paris. So the future is of historical studies on this Golden Age is, if not 
rosy, not wholly bleak (Simons, 2002). 
 
Hence, the motivation of the paper is to show that the current international 
recognition of the Polish logical studies is disproportionate to the rich repertoire of 
methods of inquiry into language, reasoning, and argument proposed by the LWS. 
Because of the fact that some ideas of the school concern not only formal, but also 
informal analysis and evaluation of arguments, the main question is: what ideas 
present in the logical studies of the LWS are in line with the major research stands 
in informal logic? Amongst the achievements of the LWS which are significant for 
giving an answer to this question there are: the educational idea of improving 
critical thinking skills proposed by Ajdukiewicz and Czeżowski (Section 2), and the 
accounts of fallacies and superstitions conceived as pitfalls of non-critical thinking, 
as discussed by Kamiński and Bocheński (Section 3). These two components: the 
“positive” (i.e. rules of critical thinking) and the “negative” (i.e. fallacies as violations 
of these rules) were combined by Ajdukiewicz within the unified methodological 
framework for performing rules for carrying out knowledge-gaining procedures 
(Section 4). Concluding remarks (Section 5) justify the need of the systematic study 
of the correspondence between Polish logical studies and the Informal Logic 
Movement. 
 
2.  THE IDEAL OF A CRITICAL THINKER IN THE LVOV-WARSAW SCHOOL 
 
Although the researchers of the LWS do not use the term ‘critical thinking’, the 
school elaborated its own original ideal of the critical thinker. It may be identified by 
examining the core concern of the LWS which was to seek for applications of logic in 
natural language communication. This attitude is clearly explained by Tarski: 
 
[...] by perfecting and sharpening the tools of thought, [logic] makes man more 
critical – and thus makes less likely their being misled by all the pseudo-reasonings 
to which they are in various parts of the world incessantly exposed today (Tarski, 
1995, p. xi). 
 
The presence of the ideal of the critical thinker within the Polish logical 
studies is pointed out by Groarke in the entry on informal logic published in the 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: 
 
In its origins and continued evolution, informal logic has often been allied with 
educational goals, with the aim of developing ways of analyzing everyday reasoning 
that can inform, and possibly be the foundation for, general education. In North 
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America and other English speaking countries, such ideals have been associated 
with the “Critical Thinking Movement,” which aims to inform and improve public 
reasoning and debate by promoting models of education which emphasize the 
critical examination of beliefs and decisions, and the development of the skills that 
this requires. In this and other regards, informal logic has significant affinities with 
the “pragmatic logic” movement one finds within the Polish logical tradition 
(Groarke, 2011). 
 
The specification of the key tendencies of the LWS which correspond to the 
subject-matter, goals and methods of informal logic may consist in exposing: (i) the 
broad notion of logic, (ii) the educational ideal of logical culture, (iii) the pragmatic 
account of language and argument, and (iv) the rule of conceptual precision.1 
(i) The broad notion of logic. The crucial resemblance between the LWS and 
the Informal Logic Initiative lies in the claim that logic is not equivalent to formal 
logic. As Johnson points out, the tendency to tailor the concept of logic exclusively to 
formal deductive logic (FDL) is inadequate because it “cuts of logic from important 
parts of its historical development” (Johnson, 1996, p. 79). Within the LWS, the focus 
on formal models of language and reasoning did not entail the claim that logic is 
equivalent to formal logic. On the contrary, the representatives of the LWS 
employed the broad conception of logic that embraces not only formal logic, but  
also semiotics and methodology of science (see e.g., Ajdukiewicz, 1974, p. 2-4; 
Koszowy, 2010, pp. 32-33). The consequence of accepting this broad account is the 
claim that ‘logical skills’ encompass not only the skills of employing formal tools in 
language analysis, but also the skills of using semiotics to analyze natural language 
discourse, and using methodology of science in evaluating definitions, 
classifications, and questions occurring in the scientific inquiry (see the Appendix A 
in Johnson, 2009, pp. 38-39). 
(ii) The ideal of logical culture. The handy umbrella term used by the 
representatives of the LWS to denote the knowledge and skills of logic is ‘logical 
culture’ (Ajdukiewicz, 1965). The main similarity between informal logic and the 
Polish analytical tradition lies in a coherent research and education program which 
is to be instrumental in educating people to express their thoughts clearly and 
precisely and reason correctly. The conception of logical culture joins two 
components: (1) advances in the logical studies (i.e. research in logic) are claimed to 
be applicable in (2) teaching critical thinking skills (Czeżowski, 2000, p. 68; 
Koszowy, 2010). 
 (iii) The pragmatic account of language and argument. The natural feature of 
informal logic is the pragmatic approach to arguments (e.g. Johnson, 1996, pp. 103-
106; Walton, 2008, p. 2). The LWS employed the similar approach. A clear example 
of including pragmatic perspective into the philosophy of language and argument 
are Twardowski's views on symbolization in logic discussed in his paper 
``Symbolomania and Pragmatophobia'' (Twardowski, 1927/1965). The point of 
departure of Twardowski's analyses is the critique of the view (defended, amongst 
                                                        
1 Another intriguing research task would be to examine the correspondence between the ideal of 
logical culture in the LWS with the pragma-dialectical model of critical discussion. However, this 
topic goes beyond the scope of the paper.  
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others by Łukasiewicz and Leśniewski) which holds that symbolization in formal 
logic is the exclusive source of precision and clarity of language. According to 
Twardowski, this radical view called ‘symbolomania’ focuses on pure symbols 
without taking into account their uses. Symbolomania is in line with another 
attitude labeled by Twardowski ‘pragmatophobia’ which tends to avoid any 
considerations concerning objects which are represented by symbols: 
 
[...] tendency to place symbols above things may result in bending things to comply 
with symbols, that is, making statements about things according to what follows 
from symbol-based assumptions and operations, regardless of what things tell us 
about themselves, or even contrary to what they tell us about themselves 
(Twardowski, 1927/1965, p. 5). 
 
As Smith observes, Twardowski's motivation for the critique of 
symbolomania and pragmatophobia lies in his efforts to give an adequate account of 
cognitive processes: 
 
Mental processes ought, as it were, by guiding the successive stages in the process of 
production, to ensure that a meaning of an appropriate kind is capable of being 
bestowed upon its products and thereby also ensure that these products do not 
depart from the world of things (Smith, 1994, p. 186). 
 
This approach illustrates an interesting balance in the LWS between the 
formal and the informal approaches to language and argument. On the one hand 
Twardowski appreciated the role of symbolization in modern science, and, on the 
other hand, he strongly stressed the need of applying semantic and pragmatic 
criteria of correctness of thinking and cognizing. This tendency is in accord with 
some accounts of informal logic (e.g. Walton, 2008, pp. 1-2), which tend to achieve 
the balance between the indispensability of formal tools in argument analysis and 
the necessity of employing the pragmatic perspective.  
 (iv) The rule of conceptual precision. One of the main goals of informal logic 
which is the clarification of meaning (Johnson, 1996, p. 55-57 and 68-69): the 
valuable attitude in analyzing and evaluating arguments is to be sensitive to 
questions of language and meaning. The same postulate lies in the very core of the 
methodological program of the LWS. Twardowski and his students believed that 
solid analysis of the uses of language is the point of departure for solving 
philosophical problems in the most reasonable way. For example, they claimed that 
one of the reasons of common misunderstandings in philosophical discussions lies 
in the fact that the statements in a discourse are usually not sufficiently clear 
because of the use of some ambiguous expressions. Thus, the key goal of the analysis 
of philosophical problems was to formulate a given term or statement as clearly as 
possible in order to avoid the obscure style in thinking and expressing thoughts. 
This ``rule of conceptual precision” was one of the “fundamental methodological 
rules scrupulously observed in the Lvov-Warsaw School” (Jadacki, 2009, p. 69). 
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3. FALLACIES AS PITFALLS OF NON-CRITICAL THINKING 
 
The systematic study of the logical fallacies was organically connected with 
popularizing the ideal of logical culture in Poland. Apart from the “positive” goal of 
improving knowledge and skills of logical culture, the “negative” part of inquiry was 
to identify typical fallacies in speech communication and reasoning. The common 
tendency of the study of the fallacies in the LWS manifests itself in the optimistic 
claim that the study of the common mishaps of language use, reasoning and 
argumentation helps to become aware of the typical cognitive and linguistic 
mechanisms of arriving at error. Moreover, the tradition of the LWS tends to avoid 
the `naive' fallacy approach which consists in identifying fallacies by employing the 
catalogue of typical fallacies. Instead, it aims at proposing concrete rules for correct 
thinking and language use.  
These tendencies may be observed in Kamiński’s taxonomy of logical 
fallacies (Kamiński, 1962, pp. 29-39; Koszowy, 2012, pp. 34-40). Kamiński 
distinguishes four general types of logical fallacies, namely epistemological fallacies, 
semiotic fallacies, fallacies of reasoning (``logical fallacies in a strict sense''), and 
methodological fallacies of employing rules governing knowledge-gaining 
procedures. This systematization may be conceived as a unifying account which 
aims to grasp a variety of violations of the rules of proper cognition. 
Another exemplification of the common tendencies in the study of the 
fallacies are Bocheński's analyses of One hundred superstitions (1994). Bocheński's 
account of superstitions has a pragmatic dimension, because his main motivation is 
to help people to recognize typical mechanisms commonly employed in the social 
sphere in order to convince someone to accept false beliefs. Moreover, superstitions 
are not only described exclusively from the inferential perspective (by detecting 
errors in reasoning), but also from the dialogical point of view (by identifying 
typical moves in the dialogue which are employed in order to spread superstitions 
in the social sphere), as well as within the rhetorical approach (by analysing 
utterances aimed at convincing someone to accept a superstition). Hence, 
Bocheński’s studies of superstitions clearly refer to the broader (i.e. social, cognitive 
and communicative) context. 
For example, the typical superstition discussed by Bocheński concerns the 
appeal to authority (Bocheński, 1994, pp. 24-26). The key part of Bocheński’s theory 
of authority (Bocheński, 1974, Ch. 4) is the distinction between ‘epistemic authority’  
and ‘deontic authority’. This ambiguity of ‘authority’ is presented by Walton (1997, 
Ch. 3) as the distinction between cognitive (de facto) and administrative (de iure) 
authority (see also Budzyńska, 2010). In what follows I propose the reconstruction 
of Bocheński’s analyses of the superstitions concerning authority by identifying 
them as fallacious argumentation schemes. According to Bocheński, a typical 
superstition concerning authority relies on claiming that every appeal to authority is 
against reason. This superstition may be reconstructed as follows. 
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Fallacious scheme: “authority is against reason” 
 
Every appeal to authority is against reason. 
One should always rely on reason. 
X is an authority in a given field. 
X says p. 
   ------------------------------------------------------- 
p should not be accepted. 
 
 The second case of a superstition concerning authority is the belief which is 
based on confusing deontic authority with epistemic authority. It may be 
reconstructed as follows.  
 
Fallacious scheme: “confusing epistemic and deontic authority” 
 
X is authorized to give directives.  
X says p. 
p belongs to assertives.  
------------------------------------------------------- 
p should be accepted. 
 
From the fact that X is a deontic authority one implies that the assertive 
(which belongs to the domain of the epistemic authority) is true. This case may be 
analysed as a clear instance of equivocation: ‘authority’ means either deontic 
authority which is authorized to formulate directives or epistemic authority which is 
authorized to formulate assertives. 
 
4. FROM THE METHODOLOGY OF SCIENCE TO THE THEORY OF CRITICAL 
ARGUMENTATION 
 
Another core concern of the LWS was to combine the ‘positive’ part of inquiry aimed 
at establishing the set of rules for critical thinking (as discussed in Section 2) with 
the ‘negative’ part of fallacies conceived as common pitfalls of non-critical thinking 
(presented in Section 3). This idea relies on proposing the model based on the rules 
of performing various knowledge-gaining procedures. In what follows I call these 
rules ‘methodological’, for rules for performing some typical knowledge-gaining 
procedures are investigated by the general methodology of science. Among these 
procedures the most significant are: reasoning, questioning, defining, classifying 
objects and formulating and testing hypotheses (Czeżowski, 2000, p. 68). 
The methodological framework for the knowledge-gaining procedures may 
be found within the program of pragmatic logic proposed by Ajdukiewicz (1974). 
The term ‘pragmatic logic’ refers to a discipline aimed at applying logic (in a broad 
sense) in analyzing and evaluating knowledge gaining procedures. The program of 
pragmatic logic is also based on the idea that general (logical and methodological) 
rules of scientific investigation should be applied in everyday communication. The 
‘pragmatic dimension’ of this approach relies on moving from the practice of 
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researchers towards formulating methodological standards (rules, norms) of 
performing various knowledge-gaining procedures: 
 
The standards of correctness of research procedures, as formulated in methodology, 
are not dictated by it to researchers in advance. Such standards are derived from 
practical activities of competent researchers, who approve of some procedures in 
research, they disapprove of others. [...] In other words, competent researchers 
develop, as a result of their practical activities, what might be termed a research 
conscience, but they do not always clearly realize the principles by which that 
‘conscience’ of theirs is guided (Ajdukiewicz, 1974, p. 187). 
 
Ajdukiewicz specifies this general idea by analyzing various cases of: (1) 
word use, (2) questioning, (3) reasoning and inference, and (4) methodological 
types of sciences such as deductive and inductive sciences. On the basis of this 
framework a unified set of methodological rules  may be determined (see Koszowy, 
2010, pp. 37-38). An example procedure which is investigated within this 
framework is defining. Two types of rules for defining may be distinguished: 
structural and pragmatic. Structural rules tell us what the proper structure of a 
given kind of definition should be. Amongst other tasks, they allow to identify 
definitions which are too broad, too narrow, or viciously circular. As examples of 
such structural rules the following may be mentioned (see, e.g. Czeżowski, 2000, pp. 
68-69): 
 
(1) An explicit definition should not be circular: in the case of an 
explicit definition, the word defined (definiendum) must not be 
used in the definiens. 
(2) The extensions of the definiendum and definiens of a lexical 
definition must not be mutually exclusive.  
(3) A definition should not be too broad: the extension of the 
definiens of a lexical definition must not be superior to the 
extension of the definiendum. 
(4) A definition should not be too narrow: the extension of the 
definiens of a lexical definition must not be inferior to the 
extension of the definiendum. 
(5) A definition should not be negative if it can be affirmative. 
 
The pragmatic rules of defining concern the context in which definitions are 
used. They are applied to identify such errors of defining as ignotum per ignotum, or 
confusing various kinds of definitions. There exists a variety of pragmatic rules. As 
examples of such rules the following may be mentioned (see, e.g. Ajdukiewicz, 1974, 
Ch. 5): 
 
(1) Descriptive definitions should not be confused with normative 
ones. 
(2) Lexical definitions should not be confused with stipulative 
ones. 
(3) Real definitions should not be confused with persuasive ones. 
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(4) In a real definition only essential (or relevant) attributes of the 
defined object should be included. 
(5) Among the essential (or relevant) attributes we should choose 
the constitutive ones (those which determine the whole), and 
disregard consecutive attributes (those which are dependent 
on and determined by the constitutive attributes). 
 
In line with numerous methods of evaluating definitions in informal logic 
(see, e.g. Walton & Macagno, 2010), the rules extracted from the works of Czeżowski 
and Ajdukiewicz may be employed as a model of evaluating definitions in 
argumentation. In order to exemplify some applications of this model (see Koszowy, 
2013, pp. 27-30), let us suppose that two parties debate whether any restrictions on 
the access to the Global Information Infrastructure (GII) are justified. Let us also 
suppose that both parties agree that the GII is the source of information. The party 
who is skeptical about any restrictions on the Internet, advances the following 
definition: the term ‘knowledge’ in its common use refers to the sum of information. 
After formulating this definition the party proceeds by advancing the argument: if 
‘knowledge’ refers to the sum of information, so the more information we collect, 
the more knowledge we possess; and as we all know, the Internet allows us to 
gather various kinds of information, so it gives us an excellent opportunity to extend 
our knowledge of the world. Therefore the access to the GII should not be restricted. 
The case is solved if this definition of the term ‘knowledge’ is accepted. Nobody 
disagrees that we have the right to search for knowledge. So there is no reason to 
restrict the access to the GII if it gives us knowledge. In this case the methodological 
rule to distinguish between a lexical definition of the term as commonly understood 
in a given language and a stipulative definition which projects the meaning of a 
given term (rule 2 on the list of pragmatic rules) is violated. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The exposition of the resemblances between the ideal of logical culture in the LWS 
and the Informal Logic Initiative in North America may constitute the point of 
departure for building the framework for future inquiry. Amongst the ideas of the 
LWS which are promising candidates for three main pillars of the future research 
project there are: (i) the account of pragmatic foundations of entailment as a clear 
example of the ideal of the critical thinker in the LWS, (ii) the account of deontic 
(administrative, de iure authority, and (iii) the study of methodological rules as 
applied to identifying fallacies. 
(i) The exemplification of bridging the gap between purely formal and purely 
descriptive approaches to language and argument are pragmatic foundations of 
entailment laid by Łuszczewska-Romahnowa (1962) and Ajdukiewicz (1974). Hence 
the model way of unifying of the normative and descriptive accounts of arguments 
within the Polish logical studies could be proposed. 
(ii) The theory of authority proposed by Bocheński (1974) is clearly in line 
with current research strands in informal logic. For example, Walton’s (1997) 
analyses of appeals to expert opinion may be compared with Bocheński’s studies of 
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epistemic and deontic authority. Since Walton’s approach focuses on the epistemic 
authority, an intriguing task would be to make use of Bocheński’s analyses in 
building the model of appeals to deontic authority. Such a model could be based on 
the typical argumentation schemes for appeals to deontic authority (see Budzyńska, 
2010) which could be accompanied by the set of critical questions used to evaluate 
such appeals. This project could be a clear instance of combining the achievements 
of  informal logic with the Polish logical studies. 
(iii) The next goal would to identify fallacies by means of methodological 
rules elaborated in pragmatic logic. The motivation for this inquiry lies in the core 
thesis defended by the members of the LWS which holds that the knowledge of 
typical fallacies allows the party in a dialogue or discussion to defend against typical 
pitfalls of critical thinking. This task could be accomplished by providing 
argumentation schemes for the fallacies and superstitions discussed by Kamiński 
and Bocheński. 
 The main advance of the proposed project lies in the fact that the three 
pillars of further inquiry have in fact a common virtue: instead of starting from 
abstract models and theories, they base on the actual language use and 
argumentative practice. 
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